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LEAVE YOUR GUNS AT HOME: THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A PROHIBITION ON
CARRYING FIREARMS AT POLITICAL
DEMONSTRATIONS
LUKE MORGAN†
ABSTRACT
Armed protest has long been a tool of American political groups.
Neo-Nazis, socialists, fascists, antifascists, the Black Panthers, neoConfederates, and others have all taken up arms not necessarily to do
violence, but to do politics. But such protests always risk rending a
violent hole in our social fabric. If war is politics by other means, armed
protests erase the distinction.
This Note argues that the Constitution’s relevant guarantees of
individual rights—the First and Second Amendments—do not include
a constitutional right to armed protest.
With respect to free speech, it is unlikely that current doctrine would
cover armed protests. But, considering ongoing First Amendment
expansion, this Note argues for a categorical exclusion of guns, and
perhaps other express constitutional guarantees, from expressive
conduct doctrine.
As for the Second Amendment, armed protest is not within the
historically understood scope of the right to keep and bear arms. More
importantly, though, Heller’s “sensitive places” exception recognizes a
fundamental reality about the relationship between the First and
Second Amendments: the Second Amendment must cede certain
arenas—churches, government buildings, schools, theaters, protests,
and the like—to the First. Instruments of violence cannot be permitted
to distort outcomes in the marketplace of ideas.
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“Don’t take your guns to town, son
Leave your guns at home, Bill
Don’t take your guns to town.”
- Johnny Cash1
INTRODUCTION
On August 12, 2017, a group of white nationalists gathered in
Charlottesville, Virginia, to protest the impending removal of a statue
of Robert E. Lee from Emancipation Park.2 One of the largest
gatherings of white supremacists in modern history,3 the event brought
together groups like Identity Evropa,4 the National Socialist
Movement,5 and Vanguard America,6 among others. Despite the
groups’ violent ideologies, one rally leader, Christopher Cantwell,
claimed the hallowed mantle of the lawful protestor: “We’re here
obeying the law. We’re doing everything that we’re supposed to do,
trying to express opinions.”7

1. JOHNNY CASH, Don’t Take Your Guns To Town, on THE FABULOUS JOHNNY CASH
(Columbia Records 1958).
2. Jacey Fortin, The Statue at the Center of Charlottesville’s Storm, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/13/us/charlottesville-rally-protest-statue.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/T7XR-QDER]. Emancipation Park was previously named Lee Park. Id.
3. Patrick Strickland, Unite the Right: White Supremacists Rally in Virginia, AL JAZEERA
(Aug. 13, 2017), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/08/unite-white-supremacists-rally-virginia170812142356688.html [https://perma.cc/9A49-G2LN].
4. See Identity Evropa, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE (last visited Dec. 14, 2017),
https://www.adl.org/education/resources/profiles/identity-evropa [https://perma.cc/9B76-H9PZ]
(describing the group as “focused on the preservation of ‘white American culture’ and promoting
white European identity”).
5. See National Socialist Movement, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (last visited Dec. 14, 2017),
https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/group/national-socialist-movement
[https://perma.cc/B8XF-A5GP] (“[T]he National Socialist Movement (NSM) is one of the largest
and most prominent neo-Nazi groups in the United States.”).
6. See Vanguard America, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE (last visited Dec. 14, 2017),
https://www.adl.org/education/resources/backgrounders/vanguard-america
[https://perma.cc/
7FVU-WH8U] (“VA is a white supremacist group that opposes multiculturalism and believes
America should be an exclusively white nation.”).
7. VICE, Charlottesville: Race and Terror – VICE News Tonight on HBO, YOUTUBE (Aug.
14, 2017) [hereinafter Charlottesville: Race and Terror], https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=RIrcB1sAN8I [https://perma.cc/7V48-8GPF]; see also First Amended Complaint for
Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 65–66, City of Charlottesville v. Pa. Light Foot Militia, No.
CL 17000560-00 (Va. Cir. Ct. Charlottesville Jan. 4, 2018), available at http://
www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/centers-institutes/constitutional-advocacy-protection/
upload/charlottesville-complaint.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XE6C-765F]
(compiling
similar
statements about the First Amendment and free speech from groups associated with the protest).
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Unsurprisingly, that wasn’t the full story. Just seconds later,
Cantwell remarked: “We’re not non-violent. We’ll fucking kill these
people if we have to.”8 After retreating from the Lee statue, another
white nationalist threatened “to send at least 200 people with guns”
back to the statue.9 There was nothing necessarily illegal about a plan
to march 200 armed protestors onto government property. Virginia is
an open-carry state;10 most people11 can legally carry most weapons12 in
most places.13 In addition to invoking the First Amendment, the white
supremacists operated under a permissive interpretation of the
Second.14
Activists on the left, arriving to counter-protest, did not bring an
olive branch to a gun fight. Armed antifascists (“antifa”)—including
Redneck Revolt, “a pro-worker, anti-racist organization” that
practices “armed community defense”15—stood ready with openly
displayed assault weapons.16 Were it not for antifa, Dr. Cornel West
said from the scene, community members and clergy “would have been
crushed like cockroaches.”17
Thus, Charlottesville was simultaneously occupied by armed
fascists and armed antifascists. Even though each group operated with

8. Charlottesville: Race and Terror, supra note 7.
9. Id.
10. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-279 to 18.2-311.2 (2017).
11. Id. §§ 18.2-308.1:1 to 18.2-308.1:5, 18.2-308.2:01 & 18.2-308.7 (prohibiting certain classes
of persons from possessing firearms).
12. Id. §§ 18.2-288 to 18.2-298 (banning machine guns), 18.2-299 to 18.2-307 (banning sawedoff shotguns and rifles) & 18.2-308.5 (banning plastic firearms).
13. Id. §§ 18.2-283 (prohibiting firearms in a house of worship), 18.2-283.1 (prohibiting
firearms in courthouses), 18.2-287.01 (prohibiting firearms in airport terminals) & 18.2-287.4
(prohibiting open carry in certain cities).
14. See JOSEPH BLOCHER & DARRELL A.H. MILLER, THE POSITIVE SECOND AMENDMENT
6–7 (2018) (explaining the importance of distinguishing between what the Second Amendment
requires and what it allows).
15. REDNECK REVOLT: ABOUT, http://www.Redneckrevolt.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/
E8TU-Y7ET] (last visited Dec. 14, 2017).
16. David A. Graham, Could Police Have Prevented Bloodshed in Charlottesville?,
ATLANTIC (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/08/could-thepolice-have-prevented-bloodshed-in-charlottesville/536775/ [https://perma.cc/B6PJ-NBFA].
17. Peter Hermann, Joe Heim & Ellie Silverman, Police in Charlottesville Criticized for Slow
Response to Violent Demonstrations, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 12, 2017, 7:41 PM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-charlottesville-police-response-20170812story.html [https://perma.cc/D5Q7-56SP].
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the implicit blessings of the first two amendments to the Constitution,18
the outcome was disastrous.
Heather Heyer, an unarmed counter-protester, was killed when
James Alex Fields—photographed earlier bearing the Vanguard
America insignia19—rammed his car into a crowd.20 The attack injured
19 others.21 Two police officers, Lt. H. Jay Cullen and Trooper Berke
M.M. Bates, died when the helicopter they were using to monitor the
clashing factions crashed.22 In addition to these three deaths, at least
thirty-five people were injured in the day’s violence.23
It is almost miraculous that the violence was not much worse.
Somehow, no one was shot, although one white supremacist fired his
gun near a group of counter-protestors.24 But the specter of what might
have happened does not lessen the tragedy of what did happen. Blood
was shed because the deterrent effect of militia weaponry25 bought the
far right enough breathing room to inflict violence on innocent

18. First Amendment protection was explicit for the white supremacist protesters. See
Kessler v. City of Charlottesville, No. 3:17CV00056, 2017 WL 3474071, at *3 (W.D. Va. Aug. 11,
2017) (rejecting Charlottesville’s attempt to stop the rally from happening).
19. Nicole Hensley, Charlottesville Crash Suspect James Fields Brandished Shield for
Vanguard America Hate Group Before Attack, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 13, 2017, 9:09 AM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/charlottesville-suspect-held-hate-group-shieldattack-article-1.3407245 [https://perma.cc/T7JB-6PF9]. Vanguard America denied any ties to
Fields. Id.
20. Jonah Engel Bromwich & Alan Blinder, What We Know About James Alex Fields, Driver
Charged in Charlottesville Killing, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/08/13/us/james-alex-fields-charlottesville-driver-.html [https://perma.cc/999S-TY9E].
21. Id.
22. Matthew Haag, Death of 2 State Troopers Adds Another Layer of Tragedy in
Charlottesville, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/14/us/virginiapolice-helicopter-crash.html [https://perma.cc/JP9R-VJ6G].
23. Deadly Car Attack, Violent Clashes in Charlottesville: What We Know Now, USA TODAY
(Aug. 13, 2017, 3:13 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2017/08/13/
charlottesville-protests-what-we-know-now/562911001/ [https://perma.cc/6Q5F-VXRT].
24. Evan Simko-Bednarski, Man Arrested for Firing Gun at Charlottesville Rally, CNN (Aug.
28, 2017, 9:08 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/27/us/man-arrested-gun-charlottesvillerally/index.html [https://perma.cc/8XHB-XA6L].
25. In addition to the white supremacists who came to protest the statue’s removal, several
right-wing militias attended the protests in an alleged attempt to protect the protestors’ right to
free speech. The militias, who claimed to disavow the white supremacists’ message, were more
heavily armed than the white supremacists. Joanna Walters, Militia Leaders Who Descended on
Charlottesville Condemn ‘Rightwing Lunatics’, GUARDIAN (Aug. 15, 2017, 2:12 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/aug/15/charlottesville-militia-free-speech-violence
[https://perma.cc/ZUF2-VAX4].
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people.26 The police either could not or would not intervene; the
government was outgunned on American soil.27
It is tempting to view Charlottesville apocalyptically—to see in the
day’s violence a vision of the future where the government, hands tied
by the First and Second Amendments, can take no action to prevent
political violence. Such a view is already taking hold in some corners.
The American Civil Liberties Union has engaged in public handwringing over whether to continue representing such demonstrators.28
At Slate, Dahlia Lithwick and Mark Joseph Stern offered a bleak
rundown of the supposed clash between the First and Second
Amendments in Charlottesville, declaring: “The Guns Won.”29
But these concerns are unduly pessimistic. The First Amendment
has survived gunfights before, and the Constitution does not prevent
us from adequately responding to those who seek to dangerously
combine guns and political expression. Ironically, the 19th-century
prosecution of a socialist immigrant may help to illuminate the hard
constitutional questions posed by 21st-century Nazis.
The late 1800s were a hotbed of unrest. As the beleaguered nation
emerged from the Civil War, industrialization began to work a massive
transformation, fueled by a wave of cheap labor from European
immigrants.30 The workers, not content to endure the brutal indignities
of these early factories, formed unions and began to strike for fairer
working conditions.31 In response, industrialists recruited private
security forces and successfully lobbied the federal government to use

26. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Hurt and Angry, Charlottesville Tries to Regroup From Violence,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/13/us/charlottesville-protestswhite-nationalists.html [https://perma.cc/XFD7-LVCV].
27. See id. (quoting Virginia Gov. Terry McAuliffe’s claim that the militias were more
heavily armed than the state police forces).
28. Joseph Goldstein, After Backing Alt-Right in Charlottesville, A.C.L.U. Wrestles With Its
Role, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/17/nyregion/aclu-freespeech-rights-charlottesville-skokie-rally.html [https://perma.cc/D5UC-7E4E].
29. Dahlia Lithwick & Mark Joseph Stern, The First and Second Amendments Clashed in
Charlottesville. The Guns Won, SLATE (Aug. 17, 2017, 7:34 PM), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/08/the_first_and_second_amendments_clashed_in
_charlottesville_the_guns_won.html [https://perma.cc/Y9KG-PCHL]; see also Luppe B. Luppen
(@nycsouthpaw), TWITTER (Sept. 2, 2018, 12:00 PM), https://twitter.com/nycsouthpaw/
status/1036328043474837504 [https://perma.cc/3LVF-RYEW] (“Where open carry was always
headed, protests and counterprotests looking more and more like paramilitary shows of force.
This is the America the NRA has made.”).
30. The Early Labor Movement, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/opb/historydetectives/feature/theearly-labor-movement/ [https://perma.cc/WLU8-EHCC] (last visited Aug. 31, 2018).
31. Id.
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the national army to break strikes.32 Violence was common, with
fatalities on both sides.33
Following the 1874 creation of the Illinois National Guard34 (at the
time, privately financed by wealthy businessmen),35 a group of German
socialists in Chicago, opposed to a world where “police clubs and
militia rifles outweighed the Constitution,”36 created the Lehr und
Wehr Verein (“Education and Defense Association”).37 Its purpose was
simple: “When the workingmen are on their guard, their just demands
will not be answered with bullets.”38
To wit, they armed themselves and marched.39 It was at the head
of one such march on September 24, 1879, that Hermann Presser was
arrested for violating the Illinois Military Code, enacted to prohibit the
workers’ marches.40 Presser rode a horse and bore a cavalry sword
while 400 of his comrades marched behind him with rifles.41 Ultimately,
the Supreme Court rejected both First and Second Amendment
defenses to Presser’s march.42
As Charlottesville and Presser v. Illinois illustrate, the American
practice of armed protest is neither exclusively modern nor exclusively
32. G. William Domhoff, The Rise and Fall of Labor Unions in the U.S., U.C. SANTA CRUZ
(Feb.
2013),
http://www2.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/power/history_of_labor_unions.html
[https://perma.cc/AH72-PN4G] (“[C]orporate leaders put their efforts into creating stronger
military forces to control workers . . . . [M]ilitia units were often directly funded and supplied by
corporate leaders . . . . The regular army also developed close ties to the industrial
companies . . . . The use of private security forces in labor disputes also grew.”).
33. Domhoff notes:
American labor relations were the most violent in the Western world with the
exception of Russia . . . . Between 1877 and 1900, American presidents sent the U.S.
Army into 11 strikes, governors mobilized the National Guard in somewhere between
118 and 160 labor disputes, and mayors called out the police on numerous occasions to
maintain “public order.”
Id.
34. Stephen P. Halbrook, The Right of Workers to Assemble and to Bear Arms: Presser v.
Illinois, One of the Last Holdouts Against Application of the Bill of Rights to the States, 76 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 943, 946 (1999).
35. Id. at 946–47.
36. Id. at 950 (quoting Christine Heiss, German Radicals in Industrial America: The Lehrund Wehr- Verein in Gilded Age Chicago, in GERMAN WORKERS IN INDUSTRIAL CHICAGO 1850–
1910: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 215 (Hartmut Keil & John B. Jentz eds., 1983)).
37. Id. at 947.
38. Id. at 948 (quoting NATHAN FINE, LABOR AND FARMER PARTIES IN THE UNITED
STATES: 1828–1928, at 106–07 (1928)).
39. See id. at 953–55 (describing Lehr und Wehr Verein marches).
40. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 253–54 (1886).
41. Id. at 254–55.
42. Id. at 269. The decision in Presser is discussed in greater detail infra Part II.B.1.
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right wing. From socialists to fascists, from the Black Panthers43 to the
Ku Klux Klan,44 from 19th-century workers fighting for dignity to 21stcentury 4chan posters aggrieved by diversity,45 Americans have always
mixed guns and politics. In an era when both American guns and
American politics seem more dangerous than ever,46 the question is
whether this tradition remains viable.
Commentators and civic associations question the sustainability of
current jurisprudence, which, painting broadly, is protective of both
guns and speech.47 Similarly, courts are faced with complaints like one
filed by the City of Charlottesville,48 which alleged that the clashing
protestors engaged in “unlawful paramilitary activity that transformed
the city into a virtual combat zone.”49

43. See ADAM WINKLER, GUNFIGHT: THE BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN
AMERICA 231 (2011) (“If it hadn’t been for the Black Panthers, a militant group of Marxist black
nationalists committed to ‘Black Power,’ there might never have been a modern gun rights
movement.”).
44. See Alex Yablon, How to Keep Armed Militias Out of Your City, THE TRACE (Sept. 3,
2018), https://www.thetrace.org/2018/09/armed-militias-right-wing-extremism-state-laws [https://
perma.cc/Y9L7-XHHW] (detailing “a 1979 incident in North Carolina, when neo-Nazis and Klan
members armed with assault weapons attacked a Communist demonstration in the city of
Greensboro, killing five leftists and injuring more than a dozen”).
45. The flag of “Kekistan,” popularized on 4chan, was flown at Charlottesville. See
Hatewatch Staff, Flags and Other Symbols Used by Far-Right Groups in Charlottesville, S.
POVERTY L. CTR. (Aug. 12, 2017), https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2017/08/12/flags-andother-symbols-used-far-right-groups-charlottesville [https://perma.cc/BWQ5-RRGC] (“The
‘national flag of Kekistan’ mimics a German Nazi war flag . . . . A 4chan logo is emblazoned in
the upper left hand corner. Alt-righters are particularly fond of the way the banner trolls liberals
who recognize its origins.”).
46. See, e.g., PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE PARTISAN DIVIDE ON POLITICAL VALUES GROWS
EVEN WIDER 1 (2017), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2017/10/
05162647/10-05-2017-Political-landscape-release.pdf [https://perma.cc/EZZ5-VAVG] (detailing
the polarization of American politics).
47. See, e.g., supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text.
48. Redneck Revolt, Vanguard America, the Virginia Minutemen Militia, and a number of
independent defendants were named. First Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory
Relief, supra note 7, at 7–15.
49. Press Release, Geo. Law Ctr., Georgetown Law’s ICAP Sues to Prevent Paramilitary
Groups’ Return to Charlottesville (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.law.georgetown.edu/
news/georgetown-laws-icap-sues-to-prevent-paramilitary-groups-return-to-charlottesville/
[https://perma.cc/8SFL-JRFR]. The case ended in a win for Charlottesville after a state judge
rejected demurrers filed by alt-right organizer Jason Kessler and Redneck Revolt. Ruling on
Demurrer at 1, 19, City of Charlottesville, et al. v. Pa. Light Foot Militia, et al., No. CL1700056000 (Va. Cir. Ct., July 7, 2018), https://www.law.georgetown.edu/icap/wp-content/
uploads/sites/32/2018/07/2018.07.07-Letter-Opinion-Ruling-on-Defendants-Demurrer-toComplaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/26WH-UME5]. The defendants then entered into a consent
decree prohibiting them from “returning to demonstrations in Charlottesville in groups of two or
more while armed with weapons.” Melissa Gomez, Charlottesville Rally Organizer Agrees to
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Legal academics have begun to face the issue as well. Prominent
First Amendment lawyer Floyd Abrams noted that the white
supremacists “will certainly claim that everything they did, everything
they said, and every action they took was protected by the First
Amendment,”50 and Alan Dershowitz claimed that “[t]he First
Amendment was designed to protect this kind of unpopular and
hateful expression.”51 Several recent and upcoming articles come down
on the other side, arguing that state laws that prohibit armed protest
are constitutional.52
This Note argues for the validity of bans on armed protest through
two novel constitutional arguments. The first is that gun possession—
even (or, perhaps, especially) at political rallies—ought to be
categorically excluded from First Amendment coverage as expressive
conduct. The second is that the First Amendment necessarily limits the
Second Amendment by way of the Second’s “sensitive places”
exception, which ought to be interpreted to protect those places where
the presence of guns negatively impacts the exercise of free speech,
including political rallies.

Discourage Violence in Future Demonstrations, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/12/us/jason-kessler-charlottesville-violence-discourage.html
[https://perma.cc/JNQ7-ZMMY].
50. Leah Litman & Lark Turner, The Easy Take and the Right Take on the Charlottesville
Lawsuit, TAKE CARE (Oct. 16, 2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/the-easy-take-and-the-righttake-on-the-charlottesville-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/KW7S-YM7V].
51. Id.
52. Katlyn E. DeBoer, Clash of the First and Second Amendments: Proposed Regulation of
Armed Protests, 45 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 333, 334 (2018); Eric Tirschwell & Alla Lefkowitz,
Prohibiting Guns at Public Demonstrations: Debunking First and Second Amendment Myths After
Charlottesville, 65 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 172, 174 (2018); Timothy Zick, Arming Public Protests,
104 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming Nov. 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3137374 [https://
perma.cc/C9HR-94ZB]; Kendall Burchard, Essay, Your ‘Little Friend’ Doesn’t Say ‘Hello’:
Putting the First Amendment Before the Second in Public Protests, 104 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 30,
41–43 (2018); Michael C. Dorf, Constitutional Arithmetic Post-Charlottesville: Sometimes One
Plus One Equals Zero, TAKE CARE (Aug. 20, 2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/constitutionalarithmetic-post-charlottesville-sometimes-one-plus-one-equals-zero
[https://perma.cc/QEC5EU66]. For a survey of state laws regarding armed protest as of September 2017, see Alex Yablon,
The 36 States Where Local Officials Can’t Ban Guns at Protests, THE TRACE (Sept. 11, 2017),
https://www.thetrace.org/2017/09/35-states-local-officials-cant-ban-guns-protests [https://perma
.cc/P597-CNAQ].

MORGAN POST FC (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

LEAVE YOUR GUNS AT HOME

9/20/2018 1:12 PM

183

I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT53
The First Amendment is, perhaps, America’s most robustly
enforced constitutional guarantee.54 The main thrust of its protection
is that any government regulation of speech is presumptively
unlawful.55 This Part first lays out the accepted First Amendment
principles necessary to analyze the question of guns at political
rallies—coverage and protection analysis, expressive conduct doctrine,
and the Amendment’s categorical exceptions—and then applies those
principles to armed protest. This Part ultimately concludes that armed
protest is not covered by the First Amendment because it is not
speech.56
A. Background & Methodology
1. Coverage and Protection. Government regulation of speech
may stand only if: (1) the speech falls within an excepted, unprotected
category, which is to say that it is not speech within the Amendment’s
meaning,57 or (2) the government satisfies a certain level of scrutiny,
based on the nature of the regulation or the speech.58 First Amendment

53. “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, . . . or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment has been
applied to the states through incorporation via the Fourteenth Amendment. Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
54. See Frederick Schauer, The Wily Agitator and the American Free Speech Tradition, 57
STAN. L. REV. 2157, 2159 (2005) (book review) (“[A] robust First Amendment entails societal
tolerance for what is potentially a not inconsiderable amount of real harm. American society, with
its traditions and its history, has largely decided that it should tolerate this harm . . . .”).
55. Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[T]he First Amendment means that
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter,
or its content.”).
56. I do not analyze the question of armed protest under the theoretically applicable First
Amendment right to assembly primarily because that right has “withered into a mere
afterthought, nothing more than a historical artifact.” Nicholas S. Brod, Note, Rethinking a
Reinvigorated Right to Assemble, 63 DUKE L.J. 155, 159 (2013); see also John D. Inazu, The
Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, 84 TUL. L. REV. 565, 566 (2010). Any attempt to characterize an
action as assembly that could colorably be characterized as speech would be, at best, a waste of
time. Second Amendment advocates should consider the fate of the Assembly Clause to be a
cautionary tale about letting the Free Speech Clause swallow and absorb gun rights. See infra Part
I.B.2.b.
57. But see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) (rejecting the idea that
excepted categories of speech are “entirely invisible to the Constitution”).
58. John A. Humbach, The Constitution and Revenge Porn, 35 PACE L. REV. 215, 223 n.44
(2014).
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scholarship refers to these concepts, respectively, as “coverage” and
“protection.”59
Utilizing this dual framework, courts first ask whether the First
Amendment covers the conduct in question—that is, whether the First
Amendment even “shows up.”60 For example, the First Amendment
clearly “shows up” when the government censors a book, but is
nowhere to be found when the government regulates a power plant’s
carbon dioxide emissions. Even some actual speech stands outside the
umbrella of First Amendment coverage.61 Fraud,62 criminal
solicitation,63 and violent threats64 are all carried out through speech,
but nonetheless may be proscribed without reference to the First
Amendment.65
If the First Amendment does cover the speech, the question
becomes how much protection it provides. In theory, all speech that is
covered by the First Amendment may nonetheless be lawfully
regulated if the government sufficiently justifies the regulation.66
Certain categories of speech, like commercial speech,67 and certain
categories of regulation—namely, content-neutral regulation68—ease
the government’s justificatory burden.
2. Expressive Conduct. For the First Amendment to cover (and
protect) an activity, that activity must be speech. But not all “speech”
is speech. While the Court has rejected “the view that an apparently
limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’” simply because the
actor intended to express an idea,69 non-speech conduct may
nevertheless be “sufficiently imbued with elements of communication”
59. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1769 (2004) [hereinafter Schauer,
Boundaries of the First Amendment] (noting the distinction between coverage and protection).
60. Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of First Amendment Coverage, 56 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1613, 1617–21 (2015).
61. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942).
62. See Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemktg. Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 612 (2003) (“[T]he
First Amendment does not shield fraud.”).
63. See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 297 (2008) (“Offers to engage in illegal
transactions are categorically excluded from First Amendment protection.”).
64. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (per curiam) (“What is a threat must
be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech.”).
65. See infra Part I.A.3.
66. EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELATED STATUTES 3 (6th ed. 2016).
67. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983).
68. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
69. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
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to merit coverage.70 Therefore, while the guarantee of free speech
obviously does not cover arson, rape, or trespassing, it does cover the
burning of the U.S. flag,71 the possession of hardcore pornography,72
and sit-ins to protest segregation.73
The Court has developed a specific test for such “expressive
conduct.” The First Amendment covers conduct when (1) the actor
intends to convey a “particularized message,”74 and (2) it is likely that
those who view the conduct would understand the message.75
3. Categorical Speech Exceptions. Even as the First Amendment
covers some non-speech conduct, some actual speech falls outside of
its ambit, represented in the popular imagination as falsely shouting
“Fire!” in a crowded theater.76 Relevant exceptions include
incitements, threats, and speech integral to unlawful conduct.
Speech is unprotected as incitement when it aims to incite or
produce “imminent lawless action” and it is likely to do so.77 Thus, the
Constitution permits advocating the violent overthrow of the United
States government, so long as the advocate does not specify that the
revolution should begin immediately, or if the advocacy is unlikely to
produce the sought-after coup.78
Threats of violence are not covered by the First Amendment, but
the mens rea required to remove a threat from coverage is an open
question. Virginia v. Black79 suggested that speech directed “to a
person or a group of persons with the intent of placing the victim[s] in
fear of bodily harm or death” was not covered.80 Eugene Volokh

70. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974).
71. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989).
72. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969).
73. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142 (1966).
74. Spence, 418 U.S. at 410–11. But see Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of
Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) (suggesting a “particularized” message is not necessary for
First Amendment coverage). Some courts have continued to require a particularized message,
while others have generated entirely new tests. See Cressman v. Thompson, 719 F.3d 1139, 1148–
50 (10th Cir. 2013) (discussing the tests used in various circuits).
75. Spence, 418 U.S. at 410–11.
76. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (Holmes, J.) (“The most stringent
protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing
a panic.”).
77. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
78. Id. at 453–54.
79. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
80. Id. at 360 (emphasis added).
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therefore interprets Black to require a mens rea of purposefulness.81
But, as Volokh goes on to note, “[b]oth before and after Black . . . many
lower courts held that the First Amendment standard is negligence.”82
Under a negligence standard, threatening speech would not be covered
if a reasonable speaker should have known that their speech would
inspire fear.83
The First Amendment also does not cover “speech or writing used
as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute.”84
Under this exception, the solicitation of a crime can be punished,85 as
can, for example, the announcement of an illegal discriminatory hiring
policy, because the announcement of the policy would further the
illegal discrimination.86 Similarly, the First Amendment provides no
defense when, in violation of a valid ordinance against outdoor fires,
one burns a flag, even though flag burning is otherwise protected.87
B. Application
An application of the above principles to the question of armed
demonstrations reveals that: (1) the possession of a gun, even at a
political demonstration, is not expressive conduct under current
doctrine, (2) expressive conduct doctrine ought to be construed so as
to avoid First Amendment analysis of activities more properly
analyzed under other constitutional guarantees, and (3) armed
demonstration may additionally fall into one or more of the categorical
speech exceptions. Accordingly, the government can tell
demonstrators to leave their guns at home.
1. Armed Demonstration Fails the Expressive Conduct Test. To
date, courts have refused to categorically exclude keeping and bearing

81. VOLOKH, supra note 66, at 222.
82. Id.
83. Id.; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1985) (“A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense
when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists
or will result from his conduct.”).
84. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949).
85. Eugene Volokh, The “Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct” Exception, 101 CORNELL L.
REV. 981, 993 (2016).
86. Id. at 983 (citing Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47,
62 (2006)).
87. Id. at 1010 (citing Bohmfalk v. City of San Antonio, No. SA-09-CV-0497 OG (NN), 2010
WL 2303387, at *3–4 (W.D. Tex. June 4, 2010) and City of Columbus v. Meyer, 786 N.E.2d 521,
529 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003)).
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arms from the First Amendment.88 Thus, an analysis of expressive
conduct doctrine in action, as applied to armed demonstration, is
merited. Here, courts’ rejections of attempts to justify weapon
possession as free speech provides guidance on how to conduct such an
analysis.
In June 2010, Shawn Northrup was walking down a street with his
family, handgun holstered on his hip, when a passing motorcyclist
started an argument with him about openly carrying a gun.89 The
motorcyclist called the police, and after they arrived, Northrup made a
“furtive movement”—that is, he reached for his cell phone. The police
officers removed Northrup’s gun from its holster, handcuffed him, and
placed him in the back of a police car.90 Northrup was cited for “failure
to disclose personal information.”91 Northrup raised a First
Amendment challenge, contending that he “was engaged in symbolic
speech by openly carrying a firearm in a holster,” which “expressed his
opinion that Ohioans should exercise their fundamental right to bear
arms.”92 The district court concluded that “the fact that Northrup . . .
had to explain the message he intended to convey undermines the
argument that observers would likely understand the message.”93
Likewise, the Eastern District of Michigan rejected the First
Amendment claims of “two young, heavily armed men . . . one of them
dressed all in black and sporting sunglasses, and both carrying
impressive looking rifles and handguns in full view,” who had been
“briefly detained” by police in a twenty-minute encounter.94 During
the detainment, one of the men stated: “I’m just exercising my First
Amendment rights or my Second Amendment rights.”95 As to his First
Amendment claim, the court simply noted that, “[b]ased upon the
numerous emergency calls the City of Sterling Heights received from

88. See Nordyke v. King, 319 F.3d 1185, 1190 (9th Cir. 2003) (“As the district court noted, a
gun protestor burning a gun may be engaged in expressive conduct. So might a gun supporter
waving a gun at an anti-gun control rally.”); Burgess v. Wallingford, No. 11-cv-1129, 2013 WL
4494481, at *9 (D. Conn. May 15, 2013) (“Gun possession may, in some contexts, meet [the
expressive conduct] test and invoke First Amendment analysis.”), aff’d, 569 F. App’x 21 (2d Cir.
2014).
89. Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Div., 58 F. Supp. 3d 842, 845 (N.D. Ohio 2014), rev’d
on other grounds, 785 F.3d 1128 (6th Cir. 2015).
90. Id. at 845–46.
91. Id. at 846.
92. Id. at 847.
93. Id. at 848.
94. Baker v. Schwarb, 40 F. Supp. 3d 881, 884 (E.D. Mich. 2014).
95. Id. at 886.
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concerned citizens, it seems clear that these random observers did not
apprehend that the Plaintiffs were” trying to convey a message.96
A final example is instructive. Richard Burgess went to a pool hall,
wearing a pistol in a holster on his hip, as well as a shirt “which quoted
the Connecticut State Constitution regarding the right to bear arms.”97
He also “had copies of a . . . brochure explaining [his organization’s]
position on the legality of carrying firearms.”98 After refusing multiple
requests to conceal his weapon, Burgess left the bar.99 Police had
already been called, and he was arrested for disorderly conduct, a
charge which was later dismissed.100 Burgess subsequently filed a
complaint against the police department.101 The court held that,
because reasonable officers could disagree on whether it was likely that
others would recognize the man’s message, the officers were entitled
to qualified immunity:
While plaintiff’s shirt makes it more likely that those who viewed his
overall conduct would understand his message than if he were only
openly carrying his weapon, [it was unclear that his possession of a
gun was a] particularized message regarding the Second Amendment
rather than, for example, a weapon carried for protection.102

As these cases indicate, gun possessors frequently fail to express a
particularized message that others are likely to understand. Burning
the American flag, with no other speech, clearly conveys a message.103
Waving a gun in the air does not. An actor attempting to argue that his
armed demonstration is protected expressive conduct would be
required to show that viewers would likely understand the
demonstration as expressive of a message,104 rather than as a threat or
for self-defense. Such a showing is extremely unlikely because “[t]here
is no way to effectively divorce the use of a gun as an instrumentality
of violence and self-defense from any intended use of it as a symbol.”105
Consider the confusion wrought by the rash of protestors who carried

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 895.
Burgess v. Wallingford, No. 11-cv-1129, 2013 WL 4494481, at *1 (D. Conn. May 15, 2013).
Id.
Id. at *1–2.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id. at *9.
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404–06 (1989).
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974).
DeBoer, supra note 52, at 345.
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assault weapons to President Barack Obama’s healthcare town halls in
2010.106 One such protestor told an interviewer that he carried the gun
“because he could.”107 Another claimed he was attempting to express
the message that “if you don’t use your rights, then you lose your
rights.”108 The concerned reaction from bystanders, as in Baker v.
Schwarb,109 indicates that those messages were not received.110
Even when, as in Burgess v. Wallingford,111 the individual clearly
has a political stance on gun rights, he will have difficulty proving that
onlookers would likely view his gun as sending a message rather than
as a tool of violence or self-defense. Thus, the idea that “[a]ctivists
hoping to use guns as symbols may have more success convincing
courts of their intention if they do so while demonstrating at a
traditional march or rally”112 is incorrect.
In fact, armed demonstration at a pro- or anti-gun political rally
might constitute the weakest expressive conduct case: a potential
viewer would understand the message only by explanation from the
surrounding context, not solely through the actor’s conduct. The Court
has made clear that explanation by actual speech—that is, by any
protected First Amendment activity, such as signage—is fatal to an
expressive conduct claim.113
Despite the inherent difficulty gun possessors have in satisfying
expressive conduct doctrine, courts have thus far been unwilling to
categorically exclude gun possession from First Amendment coverage.
106. Mark Thompson, When Protesters Bear Arms Against Health-Care Reform, TIME (Aug.
19, 2009), http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1917356,00.html [https://perma.cc/
MPW5-Q4R8].
107. Dozens Armed With Guns Protest Obama Speech, FOX NEWS (Aug. 18, 2009),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/08/18/dozen-armed-guns-protest-obama-speech.html
[https://perma.cc/5HFT-GSFY].
108. Id.
109. Baker v. Schwarb, 40 F. Supp. 3d 881 (E.D. Mich. 2014).
110. Interview with Gun-Toting Protester at Obama Rally Was Staged, CNN (Aug. 18, 2009,
7:08 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/08/18/obama.protest.rifle/index.html [https://
perma.cc/P54G-4PRJ].
111. Burgess v. Wallingford, No. 11-cv-1129, 2013 WL 4494481 (D. Conn. May 15, 2013).
112. Daniel Horwitz, Note, Open-Carry: Open-Conversation or Open-Threat?, 15 FIRST
AMEND. L. REV. 96, 115–16 (2017).
113. See Northrup v. Toledo Police Div., 58 F. Supp. 3d 842, 848 (N.D. Ohio 2014) (discussing
Supreme Court guidance in this regard), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded by 785 F.3d
1128 (6th Cir. 2015); see also Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S.
47, 66 (2006) (“The fact that such explanatory speech is necessary is strong evidence that the
conduct . . . is not so inherently expressive that it warrants protection under O’Brien. If combining
speech and conduct were enough to create expressive conduct, a . . . party could always transform
conduct into ‘speech’ simply by talking about it.”).
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However, and counterintuitively, such a categorical exclusion would be
in the interests of both advocates and opponents of broad gun rights.
2. Let Guns be Guns (or, It’s Time to Limit Expressive Conduct
Doctrine). Despite rejecting the idea that “an apparently limitless
variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person
engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea,”114 the
Court’s own expressive conduct test contains no limitation on the
conduct that might qualify.115 The Court has even conceded that
“sleeping, arguendo, may be expressive conduct.”116 In fact, as a group
of prominent First Amendment scholars recently opined, “[n]early
every human activity can be cast as expressive in some way; nearly
every conduct-regulating law will have some incidental effect on
human activity that is not purely mechanical.”117
But if individuals continue to press First Amendment gun claims,
as the above cases suggest is likely, it may be time to limit the doctrine.
When there is another constitutional guarantee directly on point,
courts should avoid the temptation to analyze conduct under the Free
Speech Clause.118
For example, an individual who refuses to allow troops to quarter
in his home by barring his door is clearly communicating a message
that is understood by those who witness the refusal. Yet to argue that

114. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
115. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974). That said, the burden is expressly on
the actor to show that “the First Amendment even applies” in expressive conduct situations
because “[t]o hold otherwise would be to create a rule that all conduct is presumptively
expressive.” Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 n.5 (1984).
116. Clark, 468 U.S. at 294–95; see also Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights
Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1743 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (arguing that a wedding cake is “inherently communicat[ive]” because, in part, it
communicates that “a wedding has occurred” (citation omitted)).
117. Brief of Floyd Abrams et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 9, Masterpiece
Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). Though slightly less prominent, the panelists on America’s bestnamed legal podcast recently made a similar point. Tony Story, Mic Dicta (Feb. 12, 2018),
https://soundcloud.com/micdicta/episode-7-tony-story [https://perma.cc/XQF4-6ZS5] (discussing,
at 14:35, the implications of a broad understanding of expressive conduct).
118. I essentially propose a categorical rule—carrying a gun should never constitute
expressive conduct—that I expect to be the consistent outcome of courts that do apply the
expressive conduct test to the act. See Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and
Second Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 434 (2009) (“[B]alancing may eventually
evolve into categoricalism through the usual mechanisms of common law. . . . Balancing may
eventually calcify into a category . . . .”); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of
Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 62 (1992) (“A rule may be understood as simply the
crystalline precipitate of prior fluid balancing that has repeatedly come out the same way.”).
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the individual’s activity is protected under the First Amendment,
rather than the Third,119 would be absurd. An indigent defendant
demanding to speak to a lawyer is sufficiently protected by the Sixth
Amendment,120 and when he refuses to incriminate himself, there’s no
need for First Amendment protection because the Fifth Amendment
acts as his aegis.121 Similarly, if an individual cannot justify his
possession of a gun under the constitutional right to “keep and bear
Arms,” courts have no business bailing him out with the First
Amendment.
The above examples evoke the very core of the respective
amendment’s guarantee, and are thus ad absurdum in one sense. But
to treat weaker or peripheral cases from other amendments as
presenting strong First Amendment claims is an unwarranted
constitutional lifeline. As discussed below, limiting expressive conduct
doctrine when explicit guarantees apply would not result in the
underenforcement of constitutional rights but would, in fact,
strengthen the Free Speech Clause’s neighbors in the Bill of Rights.
a. Limiting Expressive Conduct Doctrine Poses No Danger of
Underenforcement. Underenforcement is already a sensitive issue in
the gun rights arena. Advocates frequently refer to the judicial branch’s
gun jurisprudence with anger over a perceived lack of respect. Before
Heller, they argue, the treatment of the Second Amendment was
“embarrassing.”122 And post-Heller, gun rights are apparently still
treated as “second-class.”123
And of course, many of America’s most cherished (or most
controversial) constitutional rights have emerged from the
“penumbras”124 of the Constitution, where different rights,
119. U.S. CONST. amend. III (“No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house,
without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.”).
120. Id. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”).
121. Id. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself.”).
122. Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 642 (1989).
123. Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447, 450 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting
from the denial of certiorari) (“I would grant certiorari to prevent the Seventh Circuit from
relegating the Second Amendment to a second-class right.”); see also Silvester v. Becerra, 138 S.
Ct. 945, 945 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (claiming that the
decision below was “symptomatic of the lower courts’ general failure to afford the Second
Amendment the respect due an enumerated constitutional right” and that “the Second
Amendment is a disfavored right in this Court”).
124. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483, 485 (1965).
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enumerated and unenumerated, are left free to interact and percolate
to the surface in new ways. The rights to use contraceptives,125 undergo
abortions,126 and enter into a same-sex marriage127 all emerged from
this constitutional alchemy.
As such, it is understandable that anyone seeking to safeguard civil
liberties generally or gun rights specifically would be hesitant to draw
ex ante limits on where in the Constitution litigants can seek
protection. In reality, though, limiting expressive conduct doctrine in
this way would not endanger unenumerated rights. Only those rights
which have constitutional text directly on point should be excluded
from expressive conduct doctrine. The rule would not preclude
expressive conduct arguments about unenumerated rights.
The actual unearthing of “hidden” constitutional rights reinforces
this point. For example, the Court’s decision in Griswold v.
Connecticut, which provided constitutional protection to the provision
of contraceptives to a married couple, relies in part on the privacy right
inherent in the First Amendment. However, that right emerges from
the Amendment’s guarantee of association, not of expressive
conduct.128 In Roe v. Wade, the Court invoked a right of privacy
“founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty
and restrictions upon state action,” with no reference to expressive
conduct doctrine.129 Nor did the Court base its decision invalidating
state bans on homosexual intercourse in Lawrence v. Texas130 on the
fact that such intercourse is an expressive act, instead relying on the
Equal Protection Clause.131 A test which merely limits the applicability
of expressive conduct doctrine does not undermine the First
Amendment ideals and principles upon which the above decisions, and
others like them, are based.
b. Limiting Expressive Conduct Doctrine Will Strengthen
Guaranteed Rights. Avoiding expressive conduct analysis will protect
constitutional gun rights, not diminish them. Experience has shown
that accepting other constitutional claims as free speech claims leads to
125. Id.
126. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129 (1973).
127. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2587–89 (2015).
128. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (“Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of
association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one . . . .”).
129. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
130. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)
131. Id. at 585.
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“a constitutional distortion.”132 Illustrative examples of weakened
constitutional guarantees can be drawn relatively easily from the Free
Speech Clause’s First Amendment neighbors.
Strategic litigants frequently will attempt to portray their non-free
speech arguments—such as those centering on the exercise of religion,
press freedom, or the ability to assemble—as free speech claims. They
do so because those claims are more likely to win, due to the rhetorical
and legal strength of the Free Speech Clause.133 This process creates a
feedback loop—more and more claimants are incentivized to
introduce, and subsequently win, other constitutional claims on free
speech grounds. Those wins create a body of good free speech
precedent. Meanwhile, the neglected provision is unable to build up
that corpus juris, and it is often left with more difficult claims that
involve no communicative activity, creating a body of unfavorable
precedent when those claims lose. The result is an “obscuring or even
undermining” of the neglected constitutional text.134 Many suggest that
this has already happened with the Free Exercise Clause, with
“plaintiffs seeking religious protection frequently abandon[ing] the
Free Exercise Clause and resort[ing] instead to the Free Speech
Clause.”135 As a result, Mark Tushnet suggests that the Free Exercise
Clause has been “render[ed] . . . redundant.”136 Patrick Garry adds that
“free exercise, without any accompanying free speech claim, can carry
relatively little weight.”137
Just as the Free Exercise Clause has been weakened, if not
devoured, by the Free Speech Clause, so too has the First
Amendment’s express guarantee of the right to “peaceably . . .
assemble” been undermined by the Free Speech Clause’s implied right
to associate. As John Inazu writes, following the Supreme Court’s lead,
“[l]ower courts have generally adopted [the Supreme Court’s]
instrumental gloss on expressive association.”138 As a result, “[a] social
132. Patrick M. Garry, Inequality Among Equals: Disparities in the Judicial Treatment of Free
Speech and Religious Exercise Claims, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 361, 363 (2004).
133. See Schauer, Boundaries of the First Amendment, supra note 59, at 1795 (“[L]awyers
representing clients with claims and causes not necessarily lying within the First Amendment’s
traditional concerns have reason to . . . modify their core claims to connect them with First
Amendment arguments, in the hope that doing so will increase the probability of success.”).
134. Id. at 388.
135. Id.
136. Mark Tushnet, The Redundant Free Exercise Clause?, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 71, 73 (2001).
137. Garry, supra note 132, at 390.
138. John D. Inazu, The Unsettling “Well-Settled” Law of Freedom of Association, 43 CONN.
L. REV. 149, 174 n.138 (2010).

MORGAN POST FC (DO NOT DELETE)

194

9/20/2018 1:12 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 68:175

group is not protected unless it engages in expressive activity such as
taking a stance on an issue of public, political, social, or cultural
importance.”139 The effect has been, essentially, a stealth repeal of an
express constitutional guarantee by the judicial branch, which has
replaced a broad but qualified freedom of public assembly with a
narrow but robust freedom of expressive association. Similarly, Sonja
West has argued in favor of “awakening the press clause” of the First
Amendment and freeing it from the “constitutional redundancy” of
being subsumed into free speech.140 West argues that the failure to
provide particularized constitutional import to the Free Press Clause
has led to “a serious weakening, if not an elimination, of our
constitutional press rights.”141
Gun rights advocates, who tend to have significant emotional
investment in the Second Amendment,142 should fear a constitutional
regime which gradually saps the Second Amendment of its vitality. The
form of such constitutional vampirism143 is not difficult to imagine in
the firearms context. Courts would, over time and in the aggregate,
provide greater protection to gun toting that is more obviously
communicative than instrumental. Are gun-rights advocates pining for
a future in which the possession of decorative weapons is more likely
to receive constitutional protection than concealed carry?
Both advocates and critics144 of gun rights ought to reject the idea
of protecting guns under the First Amendment. Both groups have a
vested interest in Heller’s145 view of constitutional gun rights as
focusing on “self-defense.”146 Advocates primarily want to avoid
139. Schultz v. Wilson, 304 F. App’x 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity
v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 229 F.3d 435, 444 (3d Cir. 2000)).
140. Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025, 1027–28 (2011).
141. Id. at 1056.
142. Peter Moore, First Amendment Is the Most Important, and Well Known, Amendment,
YOUGOV (Apr. 12, 2016, 3:15 PM), https://today.yougov.com/news/2016/04/12/bill-rights/
[https://perma.cc/9KCY-6HUG] (“Republicans (27%) are much more likely than Democrats
(6%) to say that the Second Amendment is the most important.”).
143. Schauer refers to this process as the First Amendment’s “magnetism.” Schauer,
Boundaries of the First Amendment, supra note 59, at 1795. For an in-depth examination of the
First Amendment’s interactions with other constitutional guarantees, see TIMOTHY ZICK, THE
DYNAMIC FREE SPEECH CLAUSE (2018).
144. Those who seek to limit constitutional gun rights are also unlikely to be pleased with a
regime in which a person taking an assault weapon to counter-protest a march by victims of gun
violence garners more constitutional protection than someone defending one’s home with the
family shotgun.
145. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
146. Id. at 599.
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inroads on the core right of armed self-defense147 (maintaining the
guarantee’s protectiveness), while opponents mostly hope to ensure its
scope does not expand further148 (thus limiting its coverage).
Application of the Free Speech Clause will weaken the protection of
non-communicative gun rights, as it has done to neighboring First
Amendment clauses, while at the same time expanding the coverage of
gun rights beyond the core of self-defense. Ultimately, both sides will
be dissatisfied.
c. The Unique Difficulties Posed by First Amendment Gun
Analysis. Of course, an individual instance of gun possession might
truly be both expressive and instrumental—that is, used to send a
message and also to defend oneself. But a First Amendment analysis
of gun possession has troublesome implications that strengthen the
argument for a categorical exclusion of guns from expressive conduct
doctrine.
First, if expressive conduct doctrine was without this proposed
limit, a particular act of gun possession might be protected by the First
Amendment but not by the Second Amendment. In that case, the
exceptions to the Second Amendment right listed by the Supreme
Court in Heller—for example, prohibitions on guns in schools, of
“dangerous and unusual weapons,” or of possession by felons149—
would be inapplicable. While the Supreme Court’s First Amendment
doctrine might readily handle a challenge to a law prohibiting guns in
K-12 schools,150 it is unclear whether felons’ First Amendment rights
should be so readily forfeit,151 or why a gun’s dangerousness should

147. See, e.g., Editorial, The Right of Self-Defense Is Fundamental, WASH. EXAMINER (Feb.
26, 2018, 9:02 PM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/the-right-of-self-defense-isfundamental [https://perma.cc/Y9FE-X5AA] (conceding that “[i]t’s possible to craft gun control
laws that do not infringe on the right of self-defense” and acknowledging support for such laws
despite pro-gun stance).
148. See, e.g., Editorial, Getting Control of Guns, WASH. POST (Jan. 11, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/10/AR2011011006325.html
[https://perma.cc/3WJ6-9J4Z] (arguing for “[r]easonable gun control” that “would not violate
Americans’ freedoms or inhibit hunting or self-defense”).
149. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627.
150. See Niziolek v. Upper Perkiomen Sch. Dist., 228 F. Supp. 3d 391, 398 (E.D. Pa. 2017)
(“Under Tinker, schools may restrict speech that ‘would materially and substantially interfere
with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.’” (quoting Tinker
v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969))).
151. There is, for example, already significant scholarly resistance to the Court’s
pronouncement that the Second Amendment is about self-defense and the Court’s simultaneous
exclusion of felons from that right. It is unclear why felons categorically do not possess a Second
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bear on the legality of its use in conveying a message. At some point,
the slope becomes slippery enough that the First Amendment will
readily handle an extreme example—for instance, a prohibition on
possession of nuclear weapons would certainly pass even the strictest
scrutiny.152 But to conduct such an analysis concedes that the weapon
is covered by the First Amendment, and risks the chance that at some
lesser level of dangerousness, a judge will find that a certain dangerous
weapon is also protected by the First Amendment. The categorical
exclusion from Second Amendment coverage of “dangerous and
unusual weapons” ensures no such risk exists under a Second
Amendment analysis.153
Second, the First Amendment analysis might be unnecessary
because the Second Amendment may incorporate expression to some
extent.154 For example, if the point of promoting gun ownership (on a
broad or individual scale) is to deter violence in the first instance,155
that deterrence is reliant upon would-be aggressors literally getting a
message: “Don’t mess with me, or else.” Under such a deterrence
theory, self-defense—the “central component” of the Second
Amendment156—is expressive by way of deterrence before it is
instrumental by way of violence.
Alternatively, the Second Amendment might ponder an even
more political message in carrying a weapon. If “[a] well regulated

Amendment right if its core is self-defense. See, e.g., Carlton F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions In
Search of a Theory: District of Columbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1371,
1382 (2009) (“It is very hard to see how the felon’s interest in personal defense, in protecting his
or her home and family . . . is diminished by his or her status as a convicted felon.”).
152. See R. Randall Kelso, The Structure of Modern Free Speech Doctrine: Strict Scrutiny,
Intermediate Review, and “Reasonableness” Balancing, 8 ELON L. REV. 291, 293–95 (2016) (laying
out the standards for strict scrutiny under the First Amendment).
153. For a discussion of the categorical exclusions in the Second Amendment context, see
infra Part II.B.2.a.
154. A similar but distinct argument applying expressive theories of law to the Second
Amendment is found in Darrell A.H. Miller, The Expressive Second Amendment, in GUNS IN THE
LAW (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript on file with author). Professor Miller’s argument is that
“some element other than a simple cost benefit analysis concerning self defense is at play in
making decisions about gun rights and policy.” Id. Professor Miller does not argue, as I float here,
that the Second Amendment may itself protect some kind of expression without reference to the
First Amendment.
155. See JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUN
CONTROL LAWS 20 (3d ed. 2010) (analyzing a “wide array of data” and concluding that “[c]itizens
can take private actions that also deter crime”—namely, that “[a]llowing citizens to carry
concealed handguns reduces violent crimes” and that “[m]ass shootings in public places are
reduced when law-abiding citizens are allowed to carry concealed handguns”).
156. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008) (emphasis omitted).

MORGAN POST FC (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

LEAVE YOUR GUNS AT HOME

9/20/2018 1:12 PM

197

Militia . . . [is] necessary to the security of a free State,”157 perhaps
keeping and bearing arms represents an implicit statement to
government authorities: “Don’t Tread on Me.”158 This “insurrectionist
theory” of the right has been at the core of the National Rifle
Association’s Second Amendment mythmaking for decades,159 and
academics have taken it seriously as well, with David Kopel once
referring to guns as “the tools of political dissent.”160
If either of these theories is correct, the necessary import is that
the application of First Amendment doctrine is unnecessary to
adequately protect the sorts of expressive gun-related conduct that one
might most expect to see. Rather, Second Amendment jurisprudence
should be allowed to evolve and sort out these issues.161 In particular,
because the deterrence theory assumes a simultaneous instrumentality
and expressiveness to gun possession, the question of gun rights under
such a theory would seem well suited to analysis under a constitutional
guarantee that is not solely concerned with expression. This is
especially so because the consequence of applying expressive conduct
doctrine to the deterrence theory is an absurdly broad right to open
carry in public. After all, the open possession of a weapon is meant to
send a deterrent message, and the deterrence theory assumes the
message is understood by all. Open carry would thus presumably be
covered by the First Amendment. That is, unless the message gun
possession sends is a threat.
3. Threats, Incitements, and Illegal Conduct.
If armed
demonstration qualifies as speech, it might nonetheless not be covered
if it constitutes a threat conveyed with a culpable mental state. For
example, armed demonstration might manage to convey a threat of

157. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
158. See Rob Walker, The Shifting Symbolism of the Gadsden Flag, NEW YORKER (Oct. 2,
2016), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-shifting-symbolism-of-the-gadsden-flag
[https://perma.cc/A8WZ-5JLC] (detailing the history and symbolism of the Gadsden Flag and its
“Don’t Tread on Me” language).
159. See generally JOSHUA HORWITZ & CASEY ANDERSON, GUNS, DEMOCRACY, AND THE
INSURRECTIONIST IDEA (2009) (exploring, in part, the National Rifle Association’s advocacy of
the insurrectionist theory of the Second Amendment).
160. David B. Kopel, Trust the People: The Case Against Gun Control, 3 J. ON FIREARMS &
PUB. POL’Y 77, 103 (1990).
161. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (“[S]ince this case represents this Court’s first in-depth
examination of the Second Amendment, one should not expect it to clarify the entire field . . . .”);
ZICK, supra note 143, at 203 (“The Second Amendment needs space to develop on its own,
according to the interests and values it serves.”).
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violent reprisal for contrary political views, as with the white
nationalists in Charlottesville. To the extent that that message is
successfully expressed—for example, when observers fear being
“crushed like cockroaches”162—the relevant inquiry is whether the
demonstrator had sufficient mens rea.
If judged by negligence,163 armed demonstration would virtually
always constitute a threatening statement. Many open-carry
demonstrators state that their goal is to normalize or make people
comfortable with the open carry of guns,164 which suggests a
recognition that many or most people are uncomfortable with such
displays. Thus, it would not be difficult for armed demonstration to
meet a negligence requirement—that is, that the carrier should have
known that his demonstration would inspire fear.
If the required mens rea is purposefulness, then it would be much
more difficult to argue that armed demonstration is a threat. One
would have to show that the armed demonstration was directed “to a
person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim[s] in
fear of bodily harm or death.”165
There are undoubtedly some instances when armed
demonstrators do intend to place victims in fear of bodily harm or
death. Armed militias that counter-protest peaceful calls to prayer at
mosques are one example;166 the explicit threats of the neo-Nazis in
Charlottesville another.167 However, the surrounding context could be
exculpatory. Whether the motivation of an armed march is expanded
gun rights, collectivist redistribution, or lower speed limits, the
collection of signs, banners, chants, and the like could help clarify the
intent not to terrorize by explaining the presence of guns.
Similarly, applying the incitement exception to armed
demonstration would also be a heavy lift. There may be some cases
where the evidence indicates that armed protestors or counter162. Hermann, Heim & Silverman, supra note 17.
163. See, e.g., State v. Schaler, 236 P.3d 858, 867 (Wash. 2010) (requiring proof of at least
negligence to prove guilt of threats under a harassment statute).
164. Anna M. Tinsley, Texas Gun Supporters Divided on Best Approach to Legalizing Open
Carry, STAR TELEGRAM (Nov. 17, 2013, 8:56 PM), http://www.star-telegram.com/
news/state/texas/article3836841.html [https://perma.cc/DDN3-8PTT].
165. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003).
166. Kurtis Lee & Jenny Jarvie, Anti-Sharia Rallies Around the U.S. Denounce Islam While
Stoking Concerns Among Muslim Groups, L.A. TIMES (June 10, 2017, 9:00 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-anti-muslim-rallies-20170610-story.html [https://perma.cc/
XL3T-RJXZ].
167. Charlottesville: Race and Terror, supra note 7.
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protestors are aware that their conduct may incite lawless action, either
by emboldening their ideological allies or by provoking their enemies.
But to lose First Amendment protection, a speaker must truly intend
to incite lawlessness; the mere possibility or even knowledge that
others will react violently to speech is insufficient to remove it from the
coverage of the First Amendment.168
Finally, some expressive acts of open carry may be excluded from
coverage because they are integral to a violation of an otherwise valid
general law. For example, where it is already illegal to carry certain
types of guns in public, marching with those guns will not automatically
shield the demonstrators with the First Amendment.169 Similarly, many
states punish “brandishing,” the improper or threatening display of a
weapon.170 Even if an armed demonstrator was “speaking” by waving
his gun in the air, his speech could be properly excluded from First
Amendment coverage as integral to the crime of brandishing, much
like a flag burner who cannot escape a citation for illegal outdoor
burning by invoking the First Amendment.171
II. THE SECOND AMENDMENT172
The modern Second Amendment is still in its embryonic stages.
Strictly speaking, the Supreme Court has held only the following:
neither the federal government (Heller)173 nor the states (McDonald v.
City of Chicago)174 may prohibit keeping a handgun in one’s home for

168. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–49 (1969).
169. DeBoer, supra note 52, at 363.
170. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 790.10 (2018) (“If any person having or carrying any . . . firearm . . .
or other weapon shall, in the presence of one or more persons, exhibit the same in a rude, careless,
angry, or threatening manner, not in necessary self-defense, the person so offending shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor of the first degree . . . .”).
171. Volokh, supra note 85, at 1010. A law against brandishing seems to target the very
activity (waving the gun around) that would make the conduct expressive in the first place, and
thus presents a much closer First Amendment question than a general ordinance against outdoor
fires. But such laws predate the Constitution and have existed in harmony with the Bill of Rights
since ratification. See BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 14, at 14–20 (identifying the extended
historical record of laws against brandishing and similar restrictions). The absurdity of disrupting
that harmony after more than two centuries of coexistence is a microcosmic illustration of the
necessity of turning back the First Amendment’s aggressive expansion at the gates of gun rights.
172. “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. CONST. amend. II. The Second
Amendment was incorporated to the states via the 14th Amendment in McDonald v. City of
Chicago. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010).
173. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
174. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 791.
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the purpose of self-defense, and the Second Amendment does not
necessarily only apply to guns in common use at the time of the
founding or guns most useful in warfare (Caetano v. Massachusetts).175
This Part briefly explains the holding of Heller and the Second
Amendment doctrines necessary to analyze a prohibition on armed
demonstrations. It then seeks to demonstrate that, either under a
historical analysis or because political rallies are “sensitive places,” the
Second Amendment does not cover armed demonstration.
A. Background and Methodology
1. Heller and the New Right to Bear Arms. In June 2008, the Court
essentially forged anew an area of constitutional law when it
overturned an unusually restrictive176 Washington, D.C., gun
regulation, and held that an “absolute prohibition of handguns held
and used for self-defense in the home” violated the Second
Amendment.177 The Court waved off Dick Heller’s failure to establish
why his desire to keep a pistol had “some reasonable relationship to
the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia.”178 Selfdefense, not militia readiness, it turns out, is the “central component”
of the Second Amendment right.179
Because D.C.’s law was such an outlier, Heller’s extensive dicta
have provided much of the guidance for lower court decisions since.
Namely, the Court listed several types of regulations that it suggested
were not called into question by its holding:
[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and
the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive
places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing
conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.
We also recognize another important limitation on the right to
keep and carry arms. Miller said, as we have explained, that the sorts
of weapons protected were those “in common use at the time.” . . .

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027, 1028 (2016).
Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551, 1577 (2009).
Heller, 554 U.S. at 636.
United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939).
Heller, 554 U.S. at 599 (emphasis omitted).
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We think that limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition
of prohibiting the carrying of “dangerous and unusual weapons.”180

McDonald, arriving in 2010, applied Heller’s holding to state and
local governments.181 Because the law at issue in McDonald was nearly
identical to the invalidated D.C. law, the Court did not expand on its
renewed Second Amendment, other than to recommit to the above
dicta.182 Questions thus left unanswered after Heller and McDonald
include:
•

What arms may be borne, and what arms are excluded from
Second Amendment coverage entirely?183

•

Who are the “people” to whom the right is reserved?184

•

Are there impermissible reasons to carry? Does gun possession
have to be related to self-defense to receive Second Amendment
protection?185

•

Does the Second Amendment extend outside of the home? Is
there a right to carry in public?186 What even is the home?187 Is
public carry limited to open carry, or is concealed carry within its
scope?188

•

What tier of scrutiny is appropriate to analyze gun regulations?189

180. Id. at 626–27 (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at 179).
181. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010).
182. Id. at 786.
183. See Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 121 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding that “assault weapons and
large-capacity magazines are not protected by the Second Amendment” (emphasis in original)),
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 469 (2017).
184. See United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664, 669–70 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that
unauthorized immigrants are “people” for the purposes of the Second Amendment).
185. See Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (concluding that
the Second Amendment protects “the individual right to carry common firearms beyond the
home for self-defense”).
186. See Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 939 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that there is
no right to carry a concealed firearm in public), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1995 (2017).
187. See Morris v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 990 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1086 (D. Idaho 2014)
(holding that, for Second Amendment purposes, a tent is analogous to a home).
188. See Peruta, 824 F.3d at 939 (leaving open the question of whether there is “a Second
Amendment right for a member of the general public to carry a firearm openly in public”).
189. See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682 (4th Cir. 2010) (“Heller left open the level
of scrutiny applicable to review a law that burdens conduct protected under the Second
Amendment . . . . Our task, therefore, is to select between strict scrutiny and intermediate
scrutiny.”).
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In other words, the exact contours of the Second Amendment are
very much an open question.
2. A Familiar Tool To Help Explore the Terra Incognita of the
Second Amendment. With so little guidance offered by the Supreme
Court, lower courts have been left to their own devices to determine
the scope of the Second Amendment right. The resulting morass has
been termed by some as a campaign of “massive resistance” to the progun Heller ruling190 or a concerted effort to treat the Second
Amendment as a “second-class right.”191 Others have suggested that
the confusion is an inevitable byproduct of the Supreme Court’s
silence.192
For instance, Judge J. Harvey Wilkinson has described Second
Amendment jurisprudence “as a vast terra incognita” when describing
“the dilemma faced by lower courts” in deciding “how far to push
Heller.”193 Opting to “await direction from the Court itself,” Wilkinson
wrote: “This is serious business. We do not wish to be even minutely
responsible for some unspeakably tragic act of mayhem because in the
peace of our judicial chambers we miscalculated as to Second
Amendment rights.”194 Such considerations color the field on which the
lower courts play.
Despite the difficulty, one particularly useful—and familiar—tool
has emerged from the fray: coverage and protection analysis. “[T]he
most common framework [for courts analyzing Second Amendment
questions] is a two-pronged inquiry that first asks whether a challenged
law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the scope of the Second
Amendment, and, second, if it does, whether the law satisfies the
applicable level of scrutiny.”195
190. See, e.g., Alice Marie Beard, Resistance by Inferior Courts to Supreme Court’s Second
Amendment Decisions, 81 TENN. L. REV. 673, 673 (2014) (discussing “massive resistance” in
“federal and state inferior courts” following Heller).
191. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (discussing concerns about the Second
Amendment being relegated to a “second-class right”).
192. Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 GEO. L.J. 921, 962
(2016) (“The lower courts’ treatment of Heller is thus defensible under all the models of vertical
stare decisis discussed above.”).
193. United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011).
194. Id.
195. LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, POST-HELLER LITIGATION SUMMARY 3 (Mar.
31, 2015), available at http://smartgunlaws.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Post-HellerLitigation-Summary-March-2015-Final-Version.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8TX-5B7T]; see also Nat’l
Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185,
194 (5th Cir. 2012) (describing the coverage-protection inquiry as “the prevailing approach”).
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Even where courts undertake to apply this two-step test, the
content of each step can vary drastically. To begin, it is unclear whether
the dicta from Heller regarding permissible regulations—the
“presumptively lawful” and “longstanding prohibitions” quoted
above196—relate to coverage or to protection. In other words, the
question is whether the government can prohibit guns in schools
because guns in schools simply are not part of the Second Amendment
right, or because the prohibition is justified by a compelling
government interest.
The answer is unclear because Heller points in both directions.
Just before introducing the examples of permissible regulations, Heller
says “the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited.”197
This, as the Fourth Circuit later noted, indicates that certain
regulations impinge activities “beyond the scope of the Second
Amendment”—that is, they are not covered.198 On the other hand, a
footnote suggesting such regulations are “presumptively lawful” seems
to indicate that such regulations could be unlawful under some
circumstances, which would be the case if they were subject to
protection analysis.199 For reasons discussed infra Part II.B.2.a, this
dicta should be understood as exceptions to the right’s coverage.
It is similarly unsettled what factors are relevant in coverage
analysis. Some courts perform a historical inquiry into whether the sort
of gun possession sought to be covered is analogous to a sort of gun
possession which was thought to be traditionally within the
Amendment’s guarantee.200 If the challenged regulation has a historical
analogue of sufficient pedigree and similarity, the regulation is
assumed not to even impact the Second Amendment right.201 This has
its own logical issues. First, as Justice Breyer pointed out in dissent in
Heller, the operative question is not “what 18th-century legislatures
196. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 & n.26 (2008).
197. Id. at 626.
198. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 472.
199. Id.
200. See, e.g., Jackson v. City of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 960 (9th Cir. 2014) (discussing
the Second Amendment’s historical scope).
201. See, e.g., Heller v. District of Columbia (“Heller II”), 670 F.3d 1244, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“The scope of the right is thus determined by ‘historical
justifications.’” (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 635)); Darrell A.H. Miller, Text, History, and
Tradition: What the Seventh Amendment Can Teach Us About the Second, 122 YALE L.J. 852, 918
(2013) (“Keeping, bearing, or arms that are directly supported by history or have a colorable
historical analogue fall within the protections of the Second Amendment text. Keeping, bearing,
or arms that have no historical or colorable historical analogue do not.”).
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actually did enact, but . . . what they would have thought they could
enact.”202 Second, as others have pointed out, many of those
regulations that Justice Scalia considered “presumptively lawful” due
to their longevity actually are fairly modern. For example, prohibitions
on felons carrying firearms were broadly promulgated in the 20th
century.203 Similarly, prohibitions on carrying guns in schools are also
of relatively recent vintage.204 In practice, most courts do not rely on
originalism to analyze Second Amendment cases.205
Rather, courts tend to refuse to answer the first question entirely.
Instead, they merely assume, without actually holding, that the right is
implicated, and move on to the protection question.206 Sometimes the
decision to avoid the coverage question is framed as mandated by the
lower courts’ limited role in the constitutional system. Lower courts
simply do not know the extent of the Second Amendment right, and
thus, when asked to decide whether a particular regulation implicates
the right, they are necessarily forced to go beyond what the Supreme
Court has declared to be the law of the land. Unwilling to do so, they
defer.207
The practice of punting on the coverage step has opened the courts
up to criticism from gun rights advocates. Punting on coverage puts all
of the eggs in the protection basket, and the protection step’s interestbalancing scrutiny analysis runs closer to Justice Breyer’s dissent in
Heller than the majority’s historical categoricalism.208 In practice,
202. Heller, 554 U.S. at 718 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
203. See, e.g., Larson, supra note 151, at 1376.
204. Charles C.W. Cooke, Gun Clubs at School, NAT’L REV. (Jan. 21, 2013, 9:00 AM),
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/338167 [http://perma.cc/B9UE-ZXGN].
205. Eric M. Ruben, Justifying Perceptions in First and Second Amendment Doctrine, 80 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 163 (2017) (“[O]riginalism has not been the primary means of deciding
cases.”).
206. See, e.g., United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[I]t is
unnecessary to explore . . . the question of whether and to what extent the Second Amendment
right recognized in Heller applies outside the home.”); Kolbe v. O’Malley, 42 F. Supp. 3d 768, 789
(D. Md. 2014) (“[T]he court . . . will assume, although not decide, that the Firearm Safety Act
places some burden on the Second Amendment right.”), aff’d in part, vacated in part, and
remanded by Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2016).
207. See, e.g., Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 475 (“There simply is no need in this litigation to break
ground that our superiors have not tread.”).
208. See Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer’s Triumph in the Third Battle over the Second
Amendment, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703, 706–07 (2012) (noting that lower courts “have
effectively embraced the sort of interest-balancing approach that Justice Scalia condemned,
adopting an intermediate scrutiny test and applying it in a way that is highly deferential to
legislative determinations and that leads to all but the most drastic restrictions on guns being
upheld”).
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critics argue, “[t]he very fact that a court reaches the second step all
but guarantees that the challenged law will survive.”209
Why is that outcome all but guaranteed? In dissent in Heller,
Justice Breyer predicted that “almost every gun-control regulation”
would seek justification by invoking perhaps the paramount
compelling government interest: “a concern for the safety and indeed
the lives of its citizens.”210 Sure enough, “almost all Second
Amendment cases thereafter” have relied upon public safety to justify
firearm regulations.211 With that interest in mind, perhaps it is
unsurprising that courts tend to defer to legislative judgments on the
issue of public safety, upholding the majority of gun laws
adjudicated.212
B. Application
Armed demonstration is entirely outside the scope of the Second
Amendment right. Not only does it fall outside the historically
understood ambit of the right, it also is removed from coverage by
Heller’s “sensitive places” exception.
1. History. As many have noted, Heller’s inquiry into the
historical understanding of the Second Amendment right made
extensive use of historical documents from “long after the framing of
the Amendment [that] cannot possibly supply any insight into the
intent of the Framers.”213 Justice Stevens derided Justice Scalia’s
sources as “post-Civil War legislative history.”214 In fact, Scalia quoted
material as modern as a treatise from 1891.215 Such materials, he said,
helped “to determine the public understanding of a legal text in the
period after its enactment or ratification.”216

209. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 25, Jackson v. City of San Francisco, 135 S. Ct. 2799
(No. 14-704) (2014); see also id. at 20 (“Time and again, courts have used this open-ended inquiry
to constrain the scope of the Second Amendment . . . .”).
210. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 689 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987)).
211. Ruben, supra note 205, at 164.
212. Eric Ruben & Joseph Blocher, From Theory to Doctrine: An Empirical Analysis of the
Right to Keep and Bear Arms After Heller, 67 DUKE L.J. 1433, 1472 (2018) (calculating that only
108 out of 1153 challenges have been successful, resulting in a nine percent success rate).
213. Heller, 554 U.S. at 670 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
214. Id. at 662.
215. Id. at 619 (majority opinion).
216. Id. at 605.

MORGAN POST FC (DO NOT DELETE)

206

9/20/2018 1:12 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 68:175

Setting aside the ongoing debate over Scalia’s interpretative
method, Presser217 provides important insight, contemporary with
sources used by Scalia, into the public and legal understanding of the
Second Amendment right. “We think it clear,” the Court wrote, that
“forbid[ding] bodies of men . . . to drill or parade with arms in cities
and towns unless authorized by law, do[es] not infringe the right of the
people to keep and bear arms.”218 Although the Court did not expand
on why it was “clear” that the Second Amendment did not include the
right to armed demonstration, its reasoning is evident in its First
Amendment holding:
The exercise of this power [to ban armed marches] by the states is
necessary to the public peace, safety and good order. To deny the
power would be to deny the right of the State to disperse assemblages
organized for sedition and treason, and the right to suppress armed
mobs bent on riot and rapine.219

Under Heller’s historical methodology, such a pronouncement
surely carries considerable weight,220 and it provides one basis for
finding that armed demonstrations are outside of the scope of the right.
As others have noted, many states have generally understood public
demonstrations to be outside of the ambit of constitutional gun
rights.221
2. Sensitivity. Heller’s statement that “nothing in our opinion
should be taken to cast doubt on . . . laws forbidding the carrying of
firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government
buildings”222 poses obvious interpretive difficulty. The list is explicitly

217. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
218. Id. at 264–65. The Court then moved on to apply its “conclusive” answer—later
repudiated by incorporation—that the Second Amendment did not apply to the states. Id. at 265.
219. Id. at 268.
220. The argument here is not that Presser is controlling law. Rather, Presser is useful as
evidence of the historical understanding of the Second Amendment’s scope. That said, one might
argue that because the Court provided two bases for its Second Amendment holding, and the one
on which it relied has since become defunct, this language is now the controlling law from Presser.
See, e.g., Ruling on Demurrer, supra note 49, at 18 (citing Presser in holding that the Second
Amendment would not prohibit injunctive relief against the Charlottesville defendants).
221. See Tirschwell & Lefkowitz, supra note 52, at 179–80 (listing examples of state laws
prohibiting armed demonstration); see also id. at 182 (noting that many states with preemption
laws banning local regulation of firearms allow exceptions for the regulation or prohibition of
armed demonstrations).
222. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
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illustrative rather than exhaustive,223 yet it provides little guidance for
building out the rest of its contents. No broadly accepted theory of
“sensitive places” has emerged. After analyzing how courts and
academics have fallen short in attempts to create a coherent theory,
this Part proposes such a theory.
a. Heller’s Exceptions Are Coverage Exceptions. The first step in
developing a sensitive places jurisprudence is determining whether
sensitive places are coverage exceptions or merely preordained
outcomes of protection-level scrutiny analysis. As discussed,224 Heller
points both ways on this question. When first introducing the
exceptions, the Court noted that “the right secured by the Second
Amendment is not unlimited,” and that it is “not a right to keep and
carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for
whatever purpose.”225 This suggests that there are some gun-related
activities that the Amendment simply does not “cover.” In a footnote
after introducing the list of exceptions, however, the Court referred to
them as “presumptively lawful.”226 “Presumptions” can be overcome;227
there may be instances where “presumptively lawful” laws are not
lawful. If that is true, then Heller’s list of exceptions is a protectionstage inquiry.228
Ultimately, Heller’s limits on the Second Amendment right are
best understood as exceptions to coverage. In one respect, at least, the
Court was extremely clear: “the right secured by the Second
Amendment is not unlimited.”229 Limits on a right are walls drawn

223. Id. at 627 n.26 (“We identify these presumptively lawful regulatory measures only as
examples; our list does not purport to be exhaustive.”).
224. See supra notes 197–99 and accompanying text.
225. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
226. Id. at 627 n.26.
227. See Presumption, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A presumption shifts
the burden of production or persuasion to the opposing party, who can then attempt to overcome
the presumption.”).
228. See United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 472 (4th Cir. 2011) (“The Court’s use of
the word ‘presumptively’ suggests that the articulation of sensitive places may not be a limitation
on the scope of the Second Amendment, but rather on the analysis to be conducted with respect
to the burden on that right.”); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 91 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[The
phrase ‘presumptively lawful’] may suggest the restrictions are presumptively lawful because they
pass muster under any standard of scrutiny.”).
229. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. The Court also suggested that “[t]he First Amendment contains
the freedom-of-speech guarantee that the people ratified, which included exceptions for
obscenity, libel, and disclosure of state secrets, but not for the expression of extremely unpopular
and wrongheaded views. The Second Amendment is no different.” Id. at 635.
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around it, boundaries outside of which the right simply does not
apply.230 The Court’s opinion demands an interpretation that some
forms of gun possession are outside of the Second Amendment right.231
The way that lower courts treat claims clearly within the exceptions—
for example, summarily tossing out Second Amendment challenges by
felons with a quick cite to Heller232—suggests that this is the correct
reading of the opinion.233
The “presumptively lawful” language does not belie this
conclusion. Regulations that fall outside of a constitutional guarantee’s
boundaries are still only “presumptively lawful,” in that all laws are
presumptively lawful under the rational-basis test.234 Such laws may be
unconstitutional for reasons having nothing to do with the Second
Amendment; a law creating gun-free school zones, for example, might
run afoul of the Commerce Clause.235
Therefore, those laws that prohibit the carrying of weapons in
sensitive places do not implicate the Second Amendment. The task
becomes identifying sensitive places.
b. Lower-Court Attempts to Identify Sensitive Places. Courts have
mostly avoided straying from Heller’s text when dealing with sensitive
places. Where possible, judges have relied on the “government

230. See Schauer, Boundaries of the First Amendment, supra note 59, at 1769 (“All rules—
legal or otherwise—apply only to some facts and only under some circumstances.”); see also id. at
1765 (describing some speech-like activity as “lying well beyond the boundaries of the First
Amendment’s concern”).
231. Just as some forms of speech are outside of the First Amendment right. See supra Part
I.A.3.
232. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Pallozzi, 848 F.3d 614, 626 (4th Cir. 2017) (“[W]e simply hold that
conviction of a felony necessarily removes one from the class of ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens’
for the purposes of the Second Amendment, absent . . . narrow exceptions . . . .”); see also Brief
of Plaintiff-Appellee at 12, United States v. Schrag, 542 Fed. App’x 583, No. 12-30344, 2013 WL
1951148 (2013) (“[T]he Supreme Court and this Court have made plain that felons have no
Second Amendment rights to possess firearms at all.”).
233. It is theoretically possible that the exceptions are only categorical in the sense that they
are “crystallized” versions of repeated interest balancing, as in the process described supra note
118.
234. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27; see also H. Jefferson Powell, Reasoning About the Irrational:
The Roberts Court and the Future of Constitutional Law, 86 WASH. L. REV. 217, 260–61 (2011)
(discussing Heller’s treatment of the rational-basis test); Jason Racine, Note, What the Hell[er]?
The Fine Print Standard of Review Under Heller, 29 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 605, 637 (2009) (“As a
result, the presumption created by a law extending only to sensitive places will be that of rational
basis.”).
235. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561–62 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free
School Zones Act exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause authority).
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buildings” language to uphold regulations. For example, in Bonidy v.
U.S. Postal Service,236 the Tenth Circuit confirmed that “the Second
Amendment right to carry firearms does not apply to” post offices
because they are federal buildings.237 The court further held that the
post office’s parking lot was “considered as a single unit with the postal
building itself,” and thus persons in the parking lot also had no Second
Amendment right to bear arms.238
Other courts have taken the ball and run, stretching the concept
of sensitivity to its logical limits and beyond. In People v. Yarbrough,239
the California Court of Appeals held that it did not violate the Second
Amendment to attach criminal liability to the concealed carry of a
weapon “on a residential driveway.” The driveway, according to that
court, “was not closed off from the public and was populated with
temporary occupants,” and was thus a “publicly sensitive place[].”240
That decision’s supposedly self-evident wrongness has served to some
as sufficient proof of the need for a coherent sensitive places
doctrine.241
Other courts have simply avoided the issue. In United States v.
Masciandaro,242 for instance, the Fourth Circuit dodged the question of
a National Park Service parking lot’s sensitivity by holding that the
regulation did not violate the Second Amendment no matter whether
the parking lot was a sensitive place.243
c. Academic Theories of Sensitivity. Unfortunately, despite the
importance of this question to understanding the constitutionality of a
significant proportion of gun regulations in America, very little ink has
been spilled on sensitive places, even among legal scholars.
Brian Whitman’s student comment suggests that a place may be
sensitive “if there is sensitive information or material contained or
conveyed in that place,” or “based upon the type or number of people
present.”244 Whitman goes on to propose that, even in a sensitive place,

236. Bonidy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 790 F.3d 1121 (10th Cir. 2015).
237. Id. at 1125.
238. Id.
239. People v. Yarbrough, 169 Cal. App. 4th 303 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
240. Id. at 314.
241. Brian C. Whitman, Comment, In Defense of Self-Defense: Heller’s Second Amendment
in Sensitive Places, 81 MISS. L.J. 1987, 1993 (2012).
242. United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 2011).
243. Id. at 473.
244. Whitman, supra note 241, at 2017–18.
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the constitutionality of a gun restriction further depends on whether
the place is public or private property245 and whether there is sufficient
security provided.246
Another student comment by Amy Hetzner suggests that, while
the other listed exceptions in Heller are categorical exceptions, the
sensitive places exception is akin to a “time/place/manner” restriction
under the First Amendment, and that it “requires a flexibility not
afforded by a strictly historical, categorical approach.”247 Hetzner
proposes utilizing intermediate scrutiny to judge whether a law is a
constitutional sensitive place restriction.248
Finally, Jordan Pratt proposes a “First Amendment-inspired
approach” under which courts would look to the First Amendment’s
treatment of a place in determining how the Second Amendment
analysis should play out.249 For instance, Pratt argues that colleges are
less sensitive than elementary and secondary schools in part because
college students have greater First Amendment rights.250 With respect
to government buildings, he suggests that public land “and any other
public property where a broad right to carry firearms may have
historically been permitted” are not sensitive places because they are
akin to the First Amendment’s “traditional public forum[s],” under
which the government has less authority to restrict First Amendment
rights.251 For reasons discussed in greater depth below, although each
of these theories makes reference to First Amendment values or
principles, not one adequately protects those values from the presence
of guns. A new theory is needed.
d. A New Theory. Any sensitive places theory has to fit the three
factors from Heller: (1) some meaning of the word “sensitive,” (2)
inclusion of schools, and (3) inclusion of government buildings. Schools

245. Id. at 2018–19.
246. Id. at 2019.
247. Amy Hetzner, Comment, Where Angels Tread: Gun-Free School Zone Laws and an
Individual Right to Bear Arms, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 359, 381 (2011).
248. Id. at 378–79.
249. See generally Jordan E. Pratt, A First Amendment-Inspired Approach to Heller’s
“Schools” and “Government Buildings,” 92 NEB. L. REV. 537 (2014). Pratt argues that his theory
does not consist of “clon[ing] and import[ing] in unmodified form” First Amendment doctrine
into the Second Amendment, but instead utilizes “broad themes from First Amendment law.” Id.
at 574.
250. Id. at 577–79.
251. Id. at 583.
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and government buildings may be sensitive for different reasons.252
Nonetheless, a theory relying on a common denominator between the
two would not necessarily be wrong, and it might in fact have the
advantage of a certain cleanness.
One theme runs through each of the three proposed tests above:
the First Amendment. Whitman proposes protecting “sensitive
information or material,” especially in instances when “the
information conveyed may be controversial or evoke violent
reactions,” such as in “places of worship.”253 Hetzner kicks sensitive
places to the protection question by comparing it to First Amendment
jurisprudence’s time/place/manner restrictions.254 And Pratt not only
imports First Amendment terminology, he argues that the Second
Amendment should distinguish between places in, more or less, the
exact same way the First Amendment does.255
Between Whitman and Pratt256—that is to say, between
considering First Amendment concerns and layering First Amendment
doctrine on top of the Second Amendment—the former has the better
argument. Borrowing so heavily from the First Amendment is an ill fit
for the Second Amendment.257 Nothing about college students having
greater free speech rights than kindergarteners indicates that
undergrads should also have the right to carry a weapon to Philosophy
101. The fundamental nature of the place has not changed in a way that
merits the Second Amendment reaching into the room. In fact, college
classrooms might be more sensitive than elementary and secondary
classrooms, based on the controversial nature of the material conveyed
in some lecture halls.258
252. See GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. v. Georgia, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1319 (M.D. Ga. 2011) (“A
place, such as a school, might be considered sensitive because of the people found there. Other
places, such as government buildings, might be considered sensitive because of the activities that
take place there.”), aff’d, 687 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2012).
253. Whitman, supra note 241, at 2017–18.
254. Hetzner, supra note 247, at 381.
255. See Pratt, supra note 249, at 542 (arguing that “lessons from First Amendment doctrine
counsel in favor of a narrow interpretation of Heller’s schools and government buildings”
exceptions).
256. Because of the conclusion that the sensitive places exception was intended to be a
coverage exception, see supra Part II.B.2.a, Hetzner’s protection-level test is inapposite.
257. See ZICK, supra note 143, at 203 (noting that the First and Second Amendments “pertain
to very different activities, serve distinct purposes, and raise disparate regulatory concerns”).
258. See, e.g., Brian Slodysko, Indiana’s Butler University Faces Backlash Over Trump
‘Resistance’ Class, CHI. TRIB. (May 5, 2017, 9:26 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/
nationworld/midwest/indiana/ct-butler-university-trump-resistance-class-20170505-story.html
[http://perma.cc/A3KX-ASKN] (noting that conservative backlash to Butler University’s
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Much of the focus on Heller’s “schools” example has been on the
special vulnerability children have with respect to gun violence.
Undoubtedly, the government has an interest in protecting children
from gun violence. And because children are less able to defend
themselves, perhaps the government has a stronger interest in
protecting children from gun violence than in protecting adults. But the
government has an interest in protecting everyone from gun violence—
as previously discussed, it is the paradigmatic interest used to justify
gun regulations.259 Can it really be that schools fall into a categorical
exception that other places do not when they invoke the exact same
regulatory justification as those other places, just to a slightly greater
degree?
That reasoning defies our understanding of categories in the
constitutional sense. Rather, the reason that schools are sensitive in the
Second Amendment context is that guns have a special capacity to
disrupt the school’s educational environment,260 thereby impacting
First Amendment interests.261 Similarly, the introduction of firearms
into government buildings threatens the ongoing viability of a number
of First Amendment rights. If government actors must face down
armed citizens in their day-to-day job duties, the relatively easy access
Americans have to “petition the Government for a redress of
grievances”262 will likely become much more circumscribed.

“Resisting Trump” class included “social media posts revealing a phone number and photos of
the course’s instructor”).
259. See supra notes 210–12 and accompanying text.
260. See, e.g., BRADY CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, GUN VIOLENCE IN SCHOOLS
AUGUST 2016 - MARCH 2017, at 1 (2017), http://www.bradycampaign.org/sites/default/files/
SafeSchools-Report_04-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/4XQR-R2UN] (identifying nearly 600 gun
incidents in schools nationwide between August 1, 2016, and March 17, 2017, and finding that
two-thirds of school districts conducted active-shooter drills in 2016).
261. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (“Our courts . . . have not failed to
apply the First Amendment’s mandate in our educational system where essential to safeguard the
fundamental values of freedom of speech and inquiry and of belief. . . . [T]he First Amendment
‘does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.’”); see also Keyishian v.
Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (“Our Nation is deeply
committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not
merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First
Amendment . . . .”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402–03 (1923) (holding that a law
preventing any person, including teachers, from teaching any language other than English before
the eighth grade violated substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment).
262. U.S. CONST. amend. I.

MORGAN POST FC (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

LEAVE YOUR GUNS AT HOME

9/20/2018 1:12 PM

213

Accordingly, courts should adopt the following test: a place is
sensitive under Heller when introducing guns into that place seriously
threatens core First Amendment interests or activity.263
To bite the bullet: this test suggests something akin to, although
not exactly like, a positive obligation on the government’s behalf to
enhance First Amendment rights, a position that has been anathema to
the Court.264 But the heart of the argument—that the First Amendment
has something to say about the reaches of the Second Amendment—is
not unheard of. Professor Gregory Magarian has argued that “our best
understanding of First Amendment theory and doctrine severely
diminishes the Second Amendment’s legal potency.”265 But not only
does the First Amendment cast doubt on a broad reading of the
Second, the First Amendment places firm outer bounds on the Second
Amendment.
To understand why, consider the “marketplace of ideas” theory,
which proposes that the First Amendment engenders an arena where
truth wins out over fiction and the best cure for bad speech is good
speech. The marketplace theory is central to our understanding of the
First Amendment.266 If the Second Amendment cannot categorically
exclude guns from places where truth-seeking debate reaches its peak
intensity, then the First and Second Amendments are fundamentally
incompatible. America’s classrooms, lecture halls, churches, town
halls, community centers, parks, and political demonstrations are vital
intellectual battlegrounds, but the war within and around those places

263. See GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. v. Georgia, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1319, (M.D. Ga. 2011)
(holding that a church is a “sensitive place” because the state has an “important governmental
interest” in “protecting the free exercise of religion”), aff’d, 687 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2012); see
also Burchard, supra note 52, at 42–43 (arguing that the First Amendment right to receive
information from others’ expressive activity helps to inform a “sensitive place” theory that
precludes armed demonstrations).
264. Monica Youn, The Chilling Effect and the Problem of Private Action, 66 VAND. L. REV.
1473, 1507 (2013) (distinguishing “between positive and negative” theories of the First
Amendment and explaining that “it is difficult to identify cases in which a court has held that the
First Amendment requires affirmative action to enhance positive rights”).
265. Gregory P. Magarian, Speaking Truth to Firepower: How the First Amendment
Destabilizes the Second, 91 TEX. L. REV. 49, 49 (2012).
266. See McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014) (describing the First Amendment’s
purpose as “preserv[ing] an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail” (quoting FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984))); Whitney
v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“Those who won our
independence by revolution were not cowards. . . . If there be time to expose through discussion
the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be
applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”).
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must remain one solely fought with words. The presence of guns
threatens that speech.267 The only way to ensure the vitality of our
national debates is a categorical exclusion of private gun ownership
from the essential fora in the marketplace of ideas.
To hold otherwise would be to create a massive subsidy in the
marketplace of ideas. By constitutional fiat, those ideas that require the
threat of violence to overcome reasoned dissent would be freely
allowed to exert that threat.268
If marketplace theory is true, one of three possibilities will result:
(1) ideas that require the threat of violence to overcome dissent would
start to win out over those not making use of that threat, (2) those ideas
that were previously not reinforced by the threat of violence would be
forced to accept the violence-enabling “subsidy” in order to compete
in the marketplace, or (3) the persuasive value of the threat of violence
would, at some point, in utter contradiction to millennia of human
history, dissipate, and guns would become useless or actively unhelpful
in winning political debates. The third possibility seems remote, and
neither the first nor the second seems desirable. The solution is to
protect the marketplace of ideas from guns, to the extent possible, by
protecting from guns those locations most valuable to the marketplace.
Political demonstrations are clearly “sensitive places” under this
theory. First Amendment concerns are at their apex when citizens
gather to protest and make their voices heard. Rallies implicate not
only the right to free speech but also the right of assembly or
association.269 Such events involve political speech at the core of the

267. See, e.g., DeBoer, supra note 52, at 358 (“Guns instill fear and chill speech that could
challenge the ideas of the protester, and, according to philosophers like Milton, eventually bring
about the truth through the crucible of the public discourse.”); Kenneth M. Mash, Guns on
Campus: A Chilling Effect, THOUGHT & ACTION (Fall 2013), available at http://www.nea.org/
assets/docs/HE/TA2013Mash.pdf [http://perma.cc/R3NB-2WFM] (claiming that armed college
students could stifle their classmates’ speech through intimidation and even create “a ‘chilling
effect’ on faculty being willing to share any of their controversial research with their students”);
David Frum, The Chilling Effects of Openly Displayed Firearms, ATLANTIC (Aug. 16, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/08/open-carry-laws-mean-charlottesvillecould-have-been-graver/537087/ [http://perma.cc/FGG6-TFYZ] (cataloguing instances of armed
protest, including one at a polling station, and noting that “[n]o other advanced democracy”
allows such demonstrations).
268. If the basic economic assumptions of the marketplace theory are true, individuals would
not seek to use guns to prove points unless the guns would add persuasive value. This Note
proceeds under that assumption.
269. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the
people to peaceably assemble.”).
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First Amendment.270 Political demonstrations are the beating heart of
the American story, starting with the Boston Tea Party, extending
through the Civil Rights Era marches on Selma and Washington, and
continuing into modern politics with the Tea Party rallies and the
Women’s March.
The introduction of weapons into political rallies is an obvious
threat to the passionate expression the First Amendment mandates
that we encourage by allowing such rallies. Carrying guns at a political
demonstration risks either a chilling effect or an outbreak of
violence,271 as we saw in Charlottesville, and as we have seen before.
To preserve America’s vibrant political culture, the Second
Amendment must concede the arena of political rallies to the First
Amendment.
CONCLUSION
Gil Scott Heron opined that “America is now blood and tears
instead of milk and honey.”272 But the truth is that America is both, and
always has been. Such is the unavoidable irony at the heart of our
national identity. America is Heather Heyer, yes, but we are James
Alex Fields, too. We are Eugene Debs, imprisoned for mere speech,
and we are his predecessor Hermann Presser, imprisoned for strapping
a sword to Debs’ rhetoric. We are Dr. Cornel West, staring down the
barrel of neo-Confederate assault rifles in 2017, and we are
Christopher Cantwell, staring back. There can be no easy escape from
our identity—only reckoning with it and managing it.
Thankfully, the task is not impossible. As the American tradition
of armed political demonstrations again rears its ugly head, we are not
without tools to confront the challenges posed by those claiming to

270. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010) (“Speech is an essential mechanism of
democracy, for it is the means to hold officials accountable to the people. . . . The right of
citizens . . . to speak . . . is a precondition to enlightened self-government and a necessary means
to protect it.”).
271. See John Culhane, Should Protestors Be Allowed to Have Guns?, POLITICO MAG.
(Aug. 18, 2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/08/18/should-protesters-beallowed-to-have-guns-215504 [http://perma.cc/EAY5-27FB] (“[P]ublic safety and the First
Amendment are powerfully linked . . . especially since we now know that [armed demonstrations]
can chill not only the counter-demonstrators, but even the police. If they’re afraid to do their jobs,
the First Amendment is indeed a hollow guarantee.”).
272. GIL SCOTT-HERON, Comment #1, on A NEW BLACK POET - SMALL TALK AT 125TH AND
LENOX (FLYING DUTCHMAN RECORDS 1970).
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operate within the ambit of both the First and Second Amendments.
The Constitution is not so inflexible.
We can, and must, engage in a war of ideas. But let’s leave our
guns at home.

